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 1. Introduction
There may be several reasons why sellers of private homes hire real estate brokers to handle the
sale of their houses.
Two-sided market and network eects: Real estate brokers are connected via computerized
networks that expose them to a large variety of houses for sale. Buyers are aware of that
and will therefore hire an agent who is also connected to the same network. Sellers know
that buyers tend to hire agents who are also on this network, which induces more sellers to
enlist. This \snowball" eect can potentially magnify until all sellers and buyers connect
via agents to the same network of realtors.
Nonresident sellers: Sellers who don't live in their own houses may gain additional benets
from having an agent working on the sale of their houses.
Other benets: Even if the seller resides in the house, the seller may want an agent to screen
potential buyers and to provide more \expert" information on the housing situation in a
particular area.
Condence: Selling and buying a house constitutes the major transaction of households. Some
people can nd \comfort" in having a real estate broker \holding their hand" while also
oering a second opinion before nal decisions are made.
Despite the above-listed benets to sellers, there are also two major drawbacks from employing
a real estate broker.
Commission: Sellers in the United States pay 6 percent of the nal price to their real estate
agent.
Conicting interests: Agents may provide sellers with certain information on the housing mar-
ket in order to lead them to settle on a lower price compared with the price that would
maximize sellers' expected gain. Lower prices would increase the probability of nding a
buyer and would also shorten brokers' expected waiting time until the transaction takes
place, allowing them to collect their commission sooner.
1The rst goal of this paper is to construct a simple analytical model that investigates realtors'
incentives to lower the price of the house in order to secure the sale of a house. This happens
because brokers' commission constitutes only a small fraction of the transaction value, thus,
brokers often have an incentive to \convince" sellers that waiting for a higher-paying buyer would
be risky. Lower prices increase the probability of a sale and hence yield a faster sale. Faster sales
often reduce brokers' costs by more than the extra commission they might receive from trying to
sell at higher prices.
The second goal of this paper is to calibrate the brokers' commission rate that maximizes
sellers' net-of-commission gains from selling their houses. The calibrated rates may provide a
rough estimate of whether the widely used uniform 6 percent commission rate reects collusion
among real estate agencies (in which case, the calibrated values should be much lower than the
observed value of 6 percent), or whether this rate is competitively determined (in which case
the calibrated values should be around the observed value of 6 percent). This investigation is
important in view of the long-term investigations held by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) concerning the possibility that the widespread use of the
6 percent commission rate may reect collusive behavior in the real estate brokerage industry.
Most sellers in the United States pay 6 percent commission to real estate brokers. However,
under some circumstances, an individual agent may receive only around 1:5 percent out of the
total commission because the seller's and the buyer's agents (if they are not the same) tend to
split the 6 percent commission. Then, each agency may take half of the remaining 3 percent,
leaving the individual agent, who exerts most of the eort, with only 1:5 percent. Outside the
United States, sellers' commission rates are generally much lower, often ranging from 1:5 percent
to 2 percent. This may be a consequence of the fact that buyers also pay some commission to
brokers. Clearly, it is a puzzle why discount real estate brokers are not observed more frequently
in the United States, oering perhaps more limited services at a discount. Discount brokers
are now widely observed in nancial markets. Indeed, antitrust authorities have expressed many
concerns that the uniform 6 percent commission rate may reect collusive behavior, see FTC &
DOJ (2007).
2In order to conduct the above two investigations, the paper develops a dynamic model in
which a seller of a house hires a real estate broker to handle the sale of the house. Both the
seller and the broker bear costs of delay each time the broker fails to sell the house and the sale
continues in a subsequent period. It is shown that the broker would recommend a lower price
than the price that maximizes the seller's expected gain as long as the broker's commission rate
is below 50 percent, which is always the case. In other words, sellers prefer setting a higher price,
which generally prolongs the sale of the house, compared with the price that would be set by a
commission-paid real estate broker.
The paper rst investigates a market in which the price of the house is determined by the seller
while the brokers' commission is exogenously determined, say by the association of real estate
brokers. The second investigation computes the commission rate that maximizes the expected
gain of a house seller assuming that the price of the house is determined by the real estate broker
and not by the seller.1 This assumption generates an incentive on the part of sellers to pay some
commission to brokers in order to motivate brokers to avoid setting a low price just to accelerate
the sale of the house in order to minimize the broker's cost of delay. This model is then used
to calibrate the sellers' most-desired commission rate, using data on housing prices and costs of
delay. The calibration results hint that the ongoing 6 percent commission rate, if paid to a single
broker, far exceeds the commission rate that would be preferred by a seller, despite the fact that a
higher commission rate would motivate the broker to ask for a higher price. This, however, need
not be the case if the commission is split among several brokers and agencies. The concluding
section provide a further discussion of this issue.
The idea that house sellers and real estate brokers have conicting interests is not new. In
fact, Levitt and Dubner (2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2005) test the hypothesis that real
estate brokers sell their clients' homes at lower prices than the prices they charge for selling their
own homes. They nd that homes owned by real estate agents sell for about 3:7 percent higher
1Clearly, the seller has the nal say on the price. However, in many cases, real estate brokers have a great deal
of inuence on sellers' pricing decisions, basically by providing certain information on the market thereby leading
the seller to believe that the price must be lowered. In this case, the assumption that brokers set the price is not
that far from reality. Brokers often exert pressure on buyers to lower their price by telling sellers that they will
not be able nd buyers at the price they want.
3than other houses and stay on the market about 9.5 days longer. These results support the main
result that real estate brokers tend to exert pressure on sellers to price below the levels that
maximize sellers' expected gains.
The literature on middlemen has focused mainly on some aspects of incomplete markets
and incomplete information. Garella (1989) and Biglaiser (1993) investigate the role played by
middlemen in markets characterized by \lemon problems" and adverse selection. Biglaiser and
Friedman (1994) model the role of a middleman as alleviating producers' moral hazard problem
by reducing the sales of products that are found to be of a lower quality than what producers
claim them to be. Hackett (1992, 1993) compares the incentives to invest in sales promotion
between two types of agents: a dealer and a consignment contracted agent. Hackett (1992)
demonstrates that an increase in demand variance increases the relative protability of agent
intermediary contracts. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) and Yava s (1994) describe the role of
middlemen as shortening the time it takes to match sellers with buyers in bilateral search markets.
Zorn and Larsen (1986), Schroeter (1987), Knoll (1988), and Carroll (1989) analyze the relative
eciency of a xed-percentage commission over a xed fee. The basic idea is that brokers exert
more eort on high-priced houses under a percentage commission arrangement than under a xed
fee contract.
The present paper diers from the above literature in that it does not attempt to explain
the role played by middlemen. Instead, it has a much narrower scope, which is to measure the
magnitude of the conict of interest between sellers and their realtors by examining the dierence
between house prices set by sellers and their realtors.2
Finally, some researchers have examined homeowners' choices of price and whether and when
to employ a realtor. Salant (1991) computes the optimal time for a seller to switch from selling
a house by owner to selling via a broker. More recently, Merlo, Ortalo-magn e, and Rust (2008)
provide theoretical and empirical investigations why homeowners are reluctant for a long period
of time to reduce the price of the houses they sell.
2It should be mentioned that Rubinstein and Wolinksy (1987) as well as Hackett (1992, 1993) have also
recognized that the way that middlemen contract with trading partners aects the distribution of gains from
trade between sellers and buyers.
4The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 demonstrates the inherent conict between
a seller and a real estate broker using a simple example with two types of buyers who dier
in their willingness to pay for a house. Section 3 extends the model to a continuum of buyer
types. Section 4 constructs a model in which the broker's commission is determined by a seller
who maximizes the expected net-of-commission gain from selling a house. Using this model,
Section 5 calibrates the seller-determined commission rate for a wide variety of costs of delay
that are borne by sellers and brokers, and for various distributions of buyers' willingness to pay
for a house. Section 6 concludes with several discussions of further investigations and some
unresolved issues.
2. Seller-determined Price with Exogenously Given Com-
mission Rate: Two Buyer Types
This section constructs a simple non-calculus example to illustrate the conict of interest between
a seller of a house and a real estate agent/broker. In this model, the broker's commission is
exogenously given, whereas the price of the house is determined by the seller.3 Section 4 analyzes
an alternative market structure in which the broker's commission is determined by the seller,
whereas the price of the house is determined (or heavily inuenced) by the broker. Suppose there
is a large number of potential buyers. A fraction  of these buyers have a high valuation for the
house, denoted by bH. A fraction 1    are low-valuation buyers with a maximum willingness to
pay of bL, where bH > bL > 0.
The seller sets the price p. Because there are only two types of buyers, the seller should either
set a low price p = bL, in which case a sale is always guaranteed, or a high price, p = bH, in
which case a sale occurs with probability  only.
The commission paid to the real estate agent is a fraction  (0    1) of the selling price
of the house, and is contingent on the sale of the house. The agent is not paid if there is no sale.
3As mentioned in the introduction, sellers in the United States generally pay 6 percent commission and rarely
bargain with their brokers on lower rates. Thus, it makes sense to assume that the commission rate is exogenously
given.
5The timing of the sale is as follows. In each period the seller, via a real estate broker, quotes a
price to one potential buyer who is drawn from the above distribution. The buyer then accepts
the oer, or rejects it, in which case the seller must quote a price to a newly drawn buyer in a
subsequent period. Let cs and ca denote the seller's and agent's cost (value of time) of having to
postpone the sale of the house by one period. The costs of delaying the transaction may include
forgone interest income and property taxes. Clearly, a sale is guaranteed if the seller asks for a
low price, p = bL, in which case both types of buyers would (weakly or strongly) benet from
purchasing the house. However, if the seller asks for a high price, p = bH, only one type agrees
to buy the house, and this occurs with probability .
To simplify the model, a time discount factor is not formally introduced into the model. Then,
the seller's expected net gain from setting a high price, p = bH, is
Es(p = bH) = (1   )bH  
1 X
t=1
(1   )
tcs = (1   )bH  
(1   )cs

: (1)
The rst term in (1) is the price net of broker's commission. Note that with probability 1 the sale
of the house must occur in some period t because the probability of \drawing" a high-valuation
buyer is strictly positive. The second term is the seller's expected cost of delay in selling the
house. The cost of delay is generated by a sequence of events in which only low-valuation buyers
appear during the rst t periods [probability (1   )t]. Each period when a low-valuation buyer
is drawn, the buyer rejects the seller's price p = bH, in which case the seller bears a delay cost
of cs. For example, a low-price buyer emerges in period t = 1 with probability 1   ; low-price
buyers emerge in both periods t = 1;2 with probability (1   )2, and so on. To illustrate some
specic examples of the seller's expected cost of delay: if  = 1 there is no cost of delay; whereas
the opposite extreme  ! 0 generates an innite cost of delay. If  = 0:5, the expected cost of
delay is exactly cs; and 4cs if  = 0:2.
The above discussion implies that the seller's expected gain (as a function of price) each time
a new potential buyer appears is
Es =
(
(1   )bL if p = bL
(1   )bH   (1   )cs= if p = bH:
(2)
6In either case, the seller collects only a fraction (1 ) of the price because a fraction  is paid to
the agent. The seller's expected prot (2) provides the condition under which the seller is better
o asking for a low price rather than a high price, which is given by
Es(p = bL)  Es(p = bH) i
(1   )cs

 (1   )(bH   bL): (3)
That is, if the cost of a one-period delay in the sale of the house, cs, is suciently high, then the
seller should set a low price, which would guarantee an immediate sale. Otherwise, the seller's
expected gain is higher when the seller sets a high price, under which an immediate sale occurs
with only probability . Setting a low price is also protable for the seller when the dierence
between the buyers' valuation, bH   bL, is low, because \waiting" for a high-valuation buyer to
appear does not signicantly increase the net-of-commission price.
Consider now the real estate agent's expected prot under low and high price oers made to
a randomly selected buyer. Recalling that the agent collects a fee equals to a fraction  of the
sale price, the agent's expected prot is
Ea =
(
bL if p = bL
bH   (1   )ca= if p = bH:
(4)
The agent's expected prot (4) is the analog of the seller's expected prot (2). The only
dierences are the shares in the selling price and the cost of delay if cs 6= ca. The agent's
expected prot (4) implies that
Ea(p = bL)  Ea(p = bH) i
(1   )ca

 (bH   bL): (5)
Figure 1 illustrates the parameter range under which the seller and the broker agree and
disagree on setting a low price, p = bL. Figure 1 shows that if the seller and the buyer have the
same cost of delaying a transaction (c = cs = ca), the seller's and the agent's interests coincide
only if the cost of delay takes extreme values. At intermediate values of the cost of delay, the
seller's and the agent's interests diverge. Figure 1 implies the following set of results.
Result 1. Suppose the agent's commission rate is below 50 percent ( < 0:5). Then,
70 cy
Both prefer bH

-
6
(1   )(bH   bL)
(1   )c


(bH   bL)
cz
Seller prefers bH, Broker prefers bL Both prefer bL
Conict of interest - 
c
Figure 1: Conict of interest between a seller and a broker as a function of costs of delay: Comparing
conditions (3) and (5). Note: Figure assumes equal cost of delay, c = cs = ca, and  < 0:5.
(a) If the cost of delay is high, cs = ca > cz, both the seller and the agent would choose to set
a low price, p = bL.
(b) If the cost of delay is low, cs = ca < cy, both the seller and the agent would choose to set a
high price, p = bH.
(c) Otherwise, the seller would choose a high price, whereas the agent would recommend setting
a low price.
(d) There does not exist a situation in which the seller sets a low price while the agent recom-
mends setting a high price.
Result 1 shows that a real estate agent has an incentive to \convince" the seller to lower the
price below the level that would be protable for the seller. This happens because, compared
with the seller, the agent has less to gain from selling at a high price.
Observe that Result 1 relies on the assumption that the agent receives less than 50 percent
commission ( < 0:5). This assumption is obviously realistic, considering the fact that real estate
agents in the United States earn no more than 6 percent commission. In some other countries,
8the standard commission could range between 1:5 percent and 2 percent. Clearly, Results 1(c)
and 1(d) would be reversed under the unrealistic case in which  > 0:5.
Finally, from a social welfare point of view, social loss occurs only if the sale of the house is
delayed, in which case the seller and the agent bear the per-period costs cs and ca, respectively.
Clearly, the sale price does not have any eect on social welfare because it is merely a transfer
from the buyer to the seller, and the commission is a transfer from the seller to the broker. In
order to compute the expected social loss from setting a high price, we rst compute the expected
number of periods it takes to sell the house, denoted by ET, when the price is set to p = bH.
Appendix A shows that
ET =   1 + (1   )  2 + (1   )
2  3 +  = 
1 X
t=1

(1   )
t 1  t

=
1

: (6)
For example, if there are equal numbers of low-valuation and high-valuation buyers ( = 0:5),
then the house is expected to be sold within ET = 2 periods. If  = 1=3, the house is expected
to be sold in three periods, and so on. It can be concluded from (6) that the expected social loss
from setting a high price is (cs + ca)=. Setting a low price would eliminate this loss because
a low price generates an immediate sale. Thus, despite the fact that real estate agents may
not work for the best interest of sellers, they generate faster sales, and this lowers or eliminates
sellers' and buyers' costs of delay in selling the house.
3. Seller-determined Price with Exogenously Given Com-
mission Rate: Multiple Buyer Types
This section extends the model from two types of potential buyers to a continuum of buyers whose
maximum willingness to pay is uniformly distributed on the interval [bL;bH], where bH > bL  0.
In this environment, a buyer with valuation b 2 [bL;bH] accepts all price oers p  b (and buys
the house), and rejects all price oers p > b. Therefore, for any price p  0 set by the seller, the
9probability that a sale is made in one period (with no delay) is
(p) =
8
> > <
> > :
0 if p > bH
bH   p
bH   bL
if bL  p  bH
1 if p < bL:
(7)
The following assumption is needed to obtain interior solutions.
Assumption 1. Costs of delay in selling the house are bounded relative to the range of buyers'
willingness to pay. Formally, cs < (bH   bL) and ca < (1   )(bH   bL).
Clearly, if Assumption 1 is reversed, high costs of delay may induce the seller or the broker to reduce
the price to a level that secures an immediate sale with 100 percent probability. Assumption 1
can also be expressed as a lower bound on the range of the buyers' distribution, bH   bL.
Using the same method of constructing the seller's objective function (1) and using (7), the
seller sets a price ps to maximize expected gain dened by
max
bLpbH
Es(p) = (1   )p  
1 X
t=1
[1   (p)]
tcs
= (1   )p  
[1   (p)]cs
(p)
= (1   )p  
(p   bL)cs
bH   p
: (8)
The rst term in (8) is the price net of the commission paid to the broker. Note that with
probability 1 the house must sell in some nite period t. The second term of (8) is the seller's
expected cost associated with the delay in selling the house.
Solving (8) yields a selling price and the corresponding probability of an immediate sale
ps = bH  
s
(bH   bL)cs
1   
and (ps) =
r
cs
(1   )(bH   bL)
: (9)
Thus, the price that maximizes the seller's prot decreases with the broker's commission  and
with the cost of delay cs. Consequently, an increase in the commission rate  increases the
probability of an immediate sale (p). Note that Assumption 1 guarantees that the equilibrium
probability of an immediate sale satises  < 1.
10Suppose now that the agent (instead of the seller) determines the price. Then, the agent sets
the price pa to solve
max
bLpbH
Ea(p) = p  
1 X
t=1
[1   (p)]
tca = p  
[1   (p)]ca
(p)
= p  
(p   bL)ca
bH   p
: (10)
The rst term in (10) is the commission paid to the broker from selling the house. The second
term is the broker's expected cost associated with the delay in selling the house. Solving (10)
yields
pa = bH  
s
(bH   bL)ca

and (pa) =
r
ca
(bH   bL)
: (11)
Thus, a higher commission  paid to the broker increases the broker's prot-maximizing price
and reduces the probability of an immediate sale. This result will become important in Section 4,
which assumes that the seller delegates the price decision to the broker (or is heavily inuenced
by the broker's opinion regarding the selling price).
Comparing (9) with (11) yields the following set of results.
Result 2. Suppose the seller and the agent have equal costs of delay, cs = ca = c. Then,
(a) The agent's prot-maximizing price is lower than the seller's value-maximizing price if and
only if the agent earns less than 50 percent commission. Formally, pa  ps if and only if
  0:5.
(b) The dierence between the two prices becomes larger as the commission rate declines. For-
mally, d(ps   pa)=d < 0.
(c) The house is expected to be sold faster under the agent's price relative to the seller's price.
Formally, (pa) > (ps).
Result 2(c) explains why the broker-determined price is lower than the seller-determined price|
because the broker has more to gain than the seller from a faster sale.
114. Seller Determines the Commission and Broker Deter-
mines the Price
So far, our analysis was based on the assumption that the seller must pay a predetermined
commission rate, , which cannot be negotiated. This assumption was fairly realistic in view
of our earlier discussion concerning the FTC investigation of the widely used (basically uniform
across all real estate agencies) commission rate of  = 0:06 in the United States.
This section takes the opposite approach by letting the seller determine the commission rate
paid to a real estate broker. Clearly, this rate would be close to zero if we were assuming that the
seller also determines the price of the house. To avoid this problem, this section assumes that
the seller lets the agent determine the price, see Footnote 1. This assumption provides the seller
with the incentive to pay some commission to the broker in order to motivate the broker to raise
the price, which would consequently prolong the expected time needed to sell the house.
Consider the following two-stage game between a seller of a house and a broker hired to sell
the house. In the rst stage, the seller oers the broker a commission rate of  (0 <  < 1)
as a fraction of the price. In the second stage, the broker takes the commission rate  as given
and chooses the price of the house to maximize (10). The broker's decision rule is a price as a
function of commission p(). In the rst stage, the seller can use this decision rule to determine
the broker's commission  to maximize the expected net-of-commission gain dened by (8).
The solution to the second stage is already given in (11). Substituting (11) for both p and 
into the seller's objective function (8), in the rst stage the seller sets the commission rate  to
solve
max

s() = (1   )p  
[1   (p)]cs
(p)
= (1   )bH + cS  
p
bH   bL [cs + (1   )ca]
p
 ca
: (12)
Note that the seller's prot function (12) is strictly concave with respect to  because

00
s() =
p
bH   bL [cs   ca( + 3)]
4
p
5 ca
< 0 if cs <
 + 3

ca;
which provides a suciently wide range of cost parameters under which the calibrations in Sec-
tion 5 are conducted. In particular, it holds when the seller and broker have equal costs of delay,
12cs = ca.
The rst-order condition of (12) for the general case of unequal costs of delay is
0 = 
0
s() =
p
bH   bL [ca( + 1)   cs]
2
p
3 ca
  bH; (13)
which provides the key relationship needed for the calibration of the seller-determined broker's
commission. It should be noted that for the specic case of equal costs of delay, cs = ca = c,
the commission can be explicitly extracted from (13) to be
(cs = ca = c) =
3
s
c(bH   bL)
(2bH)2 : (14)
Thus, for the special case of equal costs of delay, the broker's commission that maximizes the
seller's expected gain increases (at a lower rate) with the cost of delay c. That is, a higher cost of
delay will induce the broker to reduce the price in order to get a faster sale. The seller must then
increase commission in order to provide the opposite incentive. Although the seller also bears a
higher expected cost of delay, the seller has more to gain from a higher price than the broker.
5. Calibrations the Seller-determined Commission Rate
The model presented in Section 4 was constructed for purpose of calibrating the broker's commis-
sion rate  that would maximize the seller's expected gain, knowing that the agent will attempt
to sell the house at higher price when the commission is set at a higher rate according to (11).
The implicitly determined commission rate chosen by the seller given in (13) requires knowledge
of the cost of delay parameters cs and ca, and the buyers' distribution parameters bL and bH.
Substituting these into (13), numerical methods can be used to extract the corresponding seller's
most-preferred commission rate (cs;ca;bL;bH).
Table 1 exhibits median and average prices of houses in the United States in the years 2005
to 2008. In view of Table 1, to determine the values of bL and bH, I assume that buyers' average
willingness to pay for a private house is $250;000.
13Year Median Average
2005 $219;600 $266;600
2006 $221;900 $268;200
2007 $218;900 $265;800
Table 1: Seasonally adjusted median and average house prices in the United States, 2005{2007. Source:
National Association of Realtors' Web site, www.realtors.org.
To cover a wide range of possibilities, the calibrations below are conducted under three ex-
treme distributions around $250;000, given by the buyers' willingness to pay intervals [bL;bH] =
[$240;000;$260;000], [$225;000;$275;000], and [$200;000;$300;000]. These three distribu-
tions reect standard deviations of $5;778, $14;433, and $28;867, respectively, around a mean
willingness to pay of $250;000.
The three sections of Table 2 display the calibrated values of seller-determined broker's com-
mission rate  extracted from (13), the resulting price of a house as determined by the broker,
and consequently the probability that the house will sell in one period, both given in (11). The
Commission 
cs n ca 100 300 500 700 900
100 1.95% 2.85% 3.39% 3.81% 4.50%
500 1.85% 2.78% 3.33% 3.75% 4.50%
1000 1.74% 2.69% 3.26% 3.69% 4.50%
1500 1.64% 2.61% 3.19% 3.62% 4.50%
Price p()
cs n ca 100 300 500 700 900
100 $249,868 $245,479 $242,829 $240,825 $240,000
500 $249,605 $245,296 $242,675 $240,688 $240,000
1000 $249,277 $245,068 $242,483 $240,516 $240,000
1500 $248,950 $244,840 $242,290 $240,344 $240,000
Sale Probability (p)
cs n ca 100 300 500 700 900
100 0.51 0.73 0.86 0.96 1.00
500 0.52 0.74 0.87 0.97 1.00
1000 0.54 0.75 0.88 0.97 1.00
1500 0.55 0.76 0.89 0.98 1.00
Table 2: Seller-determined broker's commission, broker-determined price, and sale probability, assuming
that buyers are distributed on [$240;000;$260;000].
14calibrations in Table 2 are based on the seller's cost of delay cs, ranging from $100 to $1500
where a period is taken to be one month. To convince the reader that this range is sucient
to cover all types of sellers, consider the following exercise. If a house is sold and the proceeds
are invested in a saving account bearing a 5 percent annual interest rate, the monthly loss of
income from each one-month delay in selling the house is 0:05  $250;000=12  $1041. The
equivalent computation for a 4 percent interest rate yields a forgone income of $833. Clearly, a
delay in selling a house generates some additional costs, such as maintenance and property tax.
In view of this discussion, the choice of seller's monthly cost of delay ranging from $100 to $1500
is sucient to cover a wide variety of sellers. Since brokers do not bear a signicant forgone
interest income associated with a delay, brokers' cost of delay should be lower than that of sellers,
and hence a range between $100 to $900 should be sucient to cover most types of brokers.
Table 2 (and similarly Tables 3 and 4 below) reveals the following results concerning the
seller-determined broker's commission.
Result 3. Suppose the broker's commission  is determined by the seller so as to maximize
the seller's expected net-of-commission gain from selling a house. Also, suppose that the seller
delegates the selling price decision to the broker. Then,
(a) The commission increases with the broker's cost of one period delay, ca.
(b) The commission declines with the seller's cost of one period delay, cs.
Result 3(a) shows that an increase in the broker's cost of delay induces the seller to increase the
commission in an attempt to prevent the broker from setting a very low price. Clearly, with larger
cost of delay, the broker has an incentive to reduce the price in order to increase the probably of
an immediate sale, . The second and third sections of Table 2 reveal that despite the increase
in commission, the broker reduces the price (when ca increases), which in turn increases the
probability of an immediate sale. This means that it is not protable for the seller to increase
the commission to induce the broker to maintain the same price when the broker's cost of delay
increases. Instead, the seller increases commission only to mitigate the fall in price but not to
totally prevent it. The right-most column of Table 2 displays a corner solution associated with
15the broker's high cost of delay, ca = $900 (and above). In this case, the seller cannot prevent
the agent from setting the price to the lowest level on the buyers' distribution, p = $240;000,
thereby guaranteeing an immediate sale with probability  = 1. This result is special in the sense
that it relies on a relatively narrow range of buyers' willingness to pay (in contrast to Tables 3
and 4 which calibrate for a wider range of buyers' distribution).
Scrolling down on each column of Table 2 reveals that the commission set by the seller is not
very sensitive to the seller's cost of delay (as opposed to changes in the broker's cost of delay
discussed earlier). For example, the column under the 100 shows that when the seller's cost of
one period delay jumps from $100 to $1500, the seller lowers the broker's commission by very
small percentage points (1:95 percent to 1:64 percent). The reason for this small reduction is
that an increase in the seller's cost of delay increases the seller's benet from an immediate sale;
this is accomplished by slightly reducing the broker's commission  thereby inducing the broker
to lower the price p(), in order to increase the probability of an immediate sale (p).
Commission 
cs n ca 100 300 500 700 900
100 2.55% 3.73% 4.46% 5.01% 5.47%
500 2.83% 3.61% 4.36% 4.92% 5.38%
1000 2.20% 3.47% 4.23% 4.81% 5.28%
1500 2.04% 3.21% 4.11% 4.70% 5.18%
Price p()
cs n ca 100 300 500 700 900
100 $260,990 $254,959 $251,321 $248,573 $246,315
500 $260,514 $254,629 $251,043 $248,324 $246,086
1000 $259,921 $254,217 $250,695 $248,013 $245,800
1500 $259,931 $253,805 $250,347 $247,702 $245,514
Sale Probability (p)
cs n ca 100 300 500 700 900
100 0.28 0.40 0.47 0.53 0.57
500 0.29 0.41 0.48 0.53 0.58
1000 0.30 0.42 0.49 0.54 0.58
1500 0.31 0.42 0.49 0.55 0.59
Table 3: Seller-determined broker's commission, broker-determined price, and sale probability, assuming
that buyers are distributed on [$225;000;$275;000].
,
16Commission 
cs n ca 100 300 500 700 900
100 3.03% 4.45% 5.32% 5.99% 6.54%
500 2.80% 4.28% 5.18% 5.86% 6.42%
1000 2.55% 4.09% 5.00% 5.70% 6.27%
1500 2.33% 3.90% 4.84% 5.55% 6.13%
Price p()
cs n ca 100 300 500 700 900
100 $281,829 $274,047 $269,357 $265,815 $262,908
500 $281,095 $273,538 $268,928 $265,432 $262,555
1000 $280,182 $272,903 $268,391 $264,952 $262,114
1500 $279,275 $271,268 $267,855 $263,994 $261,673
Sale Probability (p)
cs n ca 100 300 500 700 900
100 0.18 0.26 0.31 0.34 0.37
500 0.19 0.26 0.31 0.35 0.37
1000 0.20 0.27 0.32 0.35 0.38
1500 0.21 0.28 0.32 0.36 0.38
Table 4: Seller-determined broker's commission, broker-determined price, and sale probability, assuming
that buyers are distributed on [$200;000;$300;000].
Tables 3 and 4 present calibrations for wider mean-preserving-spread distributions of buyers'
willingness to pay, [$225;000;$275;000] and [$200;000;$300;000], respectively. Comparing the
three tables reveals how the seller-determined commission paid to a broker is aected by enlarging
the range of buyers' willingness to pay around the same mean price $250;000.
Result 4. An increase in the range of buyers' willingness to pay around a xed mean will
(a) increase the seller-determined commission rate, , and therefore
(b) increase the broker-determined (or broker-inuenced) price of the house, and hence,
(c) decrease the probability of an immediate sale.
In fact, comparing Table 2 with Tables 3 and 4 reveals that the broker sets a price below the
mean willingness to pay when the range is narrow (Table 2), whereas the broker sets prices above
the mean under wider distributions of buyers' willingness (Tables 3 and 4).
Table 5 conrms Result 4 by displaying the values from Tables 2, 3, and 4 for \representative"
17costs of delay, cs = $1000 and ca = $300. The column under the \" in Table 5 conrms
Buyer Distribution  p() ()
[$240;000;$260;000] 2.69% $245,296 0.75
[$225;000;$275;000] 3.47% $254,217 0.42
[$200;000;$300;000] 4.09% $272,903 0.27
Table 5: The eect of widening the distribution of willingness to pay on seller-determined commission
paid to real estate brokers.
Result 4(a) showing that a wider distribution increases the commission sellers choose to pay their
real estate agents. This happens because a wider distribution increases the seller's expected gain
from selecting a higher price, as predicted by Result 4(b) and conrmed on the \p" column in
Table 5. A higher price above the mean prolongs the sale of the house, as predicted by Result 4(c)
and conrmed on the \" column in Table 5.
6. Discussion
The conict of interest between a seller of a house and a real estate agent hired by the seller
harms the seller and benets the buyer. In this model, real estate agents improve social welfare
because they reduce the cost of delay of selling houses. That is, the \pressure" agents put on
sellers to reduce their prices shortens the amount of time it takes to sell a house. Since social
welfare is not aected by the allocation of rents between sellers and buyers, and between sellers
and real estate brokers, social welfare is enhanced when sales decisions are delegated to realtors.
The conict of interest identied in this paper prevails not only in the market for real estate,
but also in some other markets. For example, in court cases in which attorneys receive a fraction
of the nal settlement instead of xed fees, attorneys may recommend their clients to settle on
lower compensation levels than the level that would maximize the expected benet of the clients.
Similar conicts may exist between stock brokers and their clients because brokers' compensation
is contingent on their clients' actual purchase and sale of stocks and mutual funds, and even in
agricultural contracts involving cropsharings.
18The calibration results hint that the ongoing commission rate of 6 percent exceeds sellers'
value-maximizing rate even in the extreme situation in which the price of the house is decided
by the broker (in which case a higher commission induces the broker to raise price and prolong
the expected time needed for selling the house). However, it should be pointed out that this
interpretation relies on the assumption that only one agent receives the full commission for
selling the house. If several brokers split the commission (such as the buyer's and seller's brokers,
and the agencies that employ these realtors) a 6 percent commission may be needed to motivate
the broker to sell at a high price. The model developed in this paper and the calibration itself can
be easily modied to capture situations in which several brokers or agencies split the commission
paid by house sellers. The important empirical question to ask in this context is what fraction of
real estate transactions involve one, two, three, or four real estate brokers.
Another related empirical question is how the levels of commission aect the speed of home
sales. This investigation may (or may not) be accomplished by comparing the number of house
visits of potential buyers divided by the number of brokers involved in the sale. One could also
investigate whether houses sold in countries with lower commission rates sell faster than in the
United States. Clearly, in such investigations it may be impossible to control for the institutional
dierences of housing markets in dierent countries.
Two features are missing from the present simple formulation: First, the model does not
embed any benets for the seller in hiring a real estate broker. The introduction discusses these
possible benets. To incorporate this feature, the sellers' utility function should be modied
slightly to include the additional possible sellers' gains from employing a broker relative to selling
\by owner" only. Second, this model does not analyze how the level of commission inuences
the eorts exerted by brokers, and how these eorts are translated into the speed of sale. It is
not clear whether any of these proposed extensions would prolong or shorten the length of time
it would take to sell a house, and for this reason I chose to ignore these two eects and to keep
the model and the calibrations as simple as possible. But it should be noted that a percentage
commission (as opposed to a lump-sum fee) generates an incentive for brokers to exert more
eort on selling more expensive houses than on low-value houses.
19Appendix A. Proof of Equation (6)
The right side of (6) can be written as
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